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Dirty Little Secrets: Fracking Fluids,
Dubious Trade Secrets, Confidential
Contamination, and The Public Health
Information Vacuum
Elliot Fink*
While the carbon energy industry has frequently claimed that
hydraulic fracturing processes and ingredients are proprietary and
protected by trade secret laws, their large scale and volume
nationwide and the well-documented dangers that they pose to
public health have brought fracking under scrutiny. When
individuals have been adversely impacted in their own backyards,
weak federal and state laws and regulation have generally left
these impacted citizens with little to no recourse and part of this
problem stems from questionable uses of privacy law, specifically
dubious claims of trade secrecy. Focusing specifically on
Pennsylvania as a model of insufficient state regulation and
Halliburton as an example of a fracking company that has utilized
privacy laws and principles at the expense of public health, this
Note examines two possible solutions to place future limits on
fracking trade secret/confidentiality agreement abuses. One
possibility is for all states that permit fracking to follow in
Montana’s recent footsteps and adopt a similarly robust state
disclosure law that meaningfully requires substantiating trade
secret status. Ultimately, however, the Montana regime is not
proactive or beneficial enough to meaningfully protect public
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health; therefore, the best solution is to incorporate the
“precautionary principle”—a pre-protection guarantee that the
trade secret is safe, as is currently used in Europe—into the
definition of trade secrets under federal and state law.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 2011, Halliburton CEO Dave Lesar made
industry-wide news when he dispatched a fellow company
executive to take a sip of the company’s new Hydraulic Fracturing
Fluid, CleanStim™, at a conference held by the Colorado Oil and
Gas Association.1 The stunt was likely meant to imply that
Halliburton’s “fracking” fluids are not harmful to humans. Indeed,
it may actually be the case that CleanStim™ is safe, since that
product is manufactured with ingredients sourced from the food
industry and the executive reported no ill-effects.2 However,
despite the fact that the CleanStim™ brochure specifically
disclaims the product being edible,3 it seems apparent that
Halliburton’s fracking chemicals are far from safe.4
On June 28, 2014 in Monroe County, Ohio, a fire at one of
Halliburton’s fracking sites caused trucks full of chemicals to
explode which in turn resulted in thousands of gallons of those
chemicals leaking into a tributary of the Ohio River.5 Yet, even
after more than 70,000 fish died and known toxic pollutants had
seeped into a drinking water source for millions of citizens, it took
approximately five days for Halliburton and the well owner to
provide the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and its
state equivalent in Ohio with the basic identity of the compounds
contained in the spilled chemicals.6 This problem was exacerbated
by Ohio law, which allowed Halliburton to shield disclosure of any
1

See Can You Drink Fracking Fluid? One Gas Exec Did, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.
22, 2011, 7:13 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-you-drink-fracking-fluid-onegas-exec-did/ [https://perma.cc/C4GG-3WUP].
2
See CleanStim™ Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid System, HALLIBURTON (2010),
https://www.halliburton.com/content/dam/ps/public/pe/contents/Data_Sheets/web/H/H07
550.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS8A-L4CY]; see also ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 1.
3
See HALLIBURTON, supra note 2.
4
ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 1.
5
See Mariah Blake, Halliburton Fracking Spill Mystery: What Chemicals Polluted an
Ohio Waterway?, MOTHER JONES, (July 24, 2014, 2:28 PM), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/halliburton-ohio-river-spill-fracking/
[https://perma.cc/RZV2-GS37].
6
See Blake, supra note 5; see also Laura Arenschield, Halliburton delayed releasing
details on fracking chemicals after Monroe County spill, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (last
updated July 21, 2014, 9:016 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014
/07/21/details-on-chemicals-trickle-in-after-spill.html [https://perma.cc/Q6MQ-5D9S].
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ingredient considered proprietary or a trade secret with anybody,
except first responders and the head of the Ohio oil and gas
regulatory body in the case of an emergency such as this.7 In the
aftermath of the spill, authorities responsible for local drinking
water, as well as local residents, never even fully learned the
identity of these secret “proprietary” chemicals despite the high
probability that the water supply had been tainted by them.8
The Monroe County incident in 2014 highlights the dangers of
fracking and the serious health implications of currently inadequate
federal and state regulations of the fluids involved in this practice,
which is intensely used across large swaths of our country.9 Even
after being involved in such a noteworthy incident of
environmental degradation, companies like Halliburton are able to
claim that their processes are entirely safe and pose minimal health
threats10 because federal and state laws allow them to shield the
identity of the chemicals used and confidential settlement
agreements permit them to silence any landowners who are
adversely affected.11 Moreover, given the essential absence of
federal regulation and the severe instances of “regulatory capture”
at many state level regulatory bodies, such as in Pennsylvania,
examined infra, the extent of previous environmental damage is
not even known.12 The result is a regulatory system where trade
7

See Blake, supra note 5.
See id.
9
See Benjamin W. Cramer, What the Frack? How Weak Industrial Disclosure Rules
Prevent Public Understanding of Chemical Practices and Toxic Politics, 25 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 67, 71 (2016).
10
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, COMMENTS OF HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. ON
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD TASK FORCE DRAFT REPORT ON
FRACFOCUS 2.0 at 13 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014
/04/f14/20140325_HESI_Comments_SEABReport_FracFocus2_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SL72-6HK8]
11
See Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims with
Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-withsealed-settlements [https://perma.cc/GQ7M-4PY6]; cf. David S. Levine, Confidentiality
Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 11, 15 (2017).
12
See, e.g., Melissa A. Troutman, Sierra Shamer & Joshua B. Pribanic, Hidden Data
Suggests Fracking Created Widespread, Systematic Impact in Pennsylvania, PUB.
HERALD: INVISIBLE HAND PROJECT (Jan. 23, 2017), http://publicherald.org/hidden-datasuggests-fracking-created-widespread-systemic-impact-in-pennsylvania/
8
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secret protection and confidentiality, two key information privacy
tools, are being utilized in such a way as to impair the public’s
right to know about the true extent of fracking’s potentially
harmful health effects.13 This raises the question of when trade
secret and other confidential business information, where secrecy
is generally preserved for the sake of fair business competition and
to incentivize innovation, must yield to a more paramount concern:
the health of our bodies, our water, and our communities.
Therefore, this Note examines the current tension between
federal and state fracking regulations, the common industry
practice of using trade secret protection and confidentiality
agreements to silence affected parties, and the public’s ability to
access critical information about potentially serious threats to
public health in their own backyard or in the watershed that
provides them drinking water. Specifically, this Note will briefly
examine what hydraulic fracturing, better known as “fracking”,
actually is, its history of use and why it has become so widespread
in recent decades. Next, documented environmental concerns will
be examined alongside current regulations at the federal and state
level and trade secret law will be introduced. Following that, the
Note discusses the extent to which fracking companies are using
trade secrets in conjunction with confidentiality agreements to
shield the public from learning about their chemical compounds
despite scientifically acknowledged health concerns. The Note then
examines whether or not fracking companies’ invocations of trade
secrecy are valid and looks at the effectiveness of certain state laws
before ultimately concluding that such invocations ultimately
amount to “opportunistic privacy” by the industry. Finally, this
Note concludes by investigating the pros and cons of two possible
solutions: Montana’s recently passed disclosure law and Professor
Julie Zink’s proposal to incorporate the “precautionary principle”
[https://perma.cc/PHY5-S9G6] [hereinafter Troutman et al., Public Herald Impact];
Melissa A. Troutman, Sierra Shamer & Joshua B. Pribanic, “To Hell With Us” – Records
of Misconduct Found Inside Pa. Drinking Water Investigations, PUB. HERALD: INVISIBLE
HAND PROJECT (Feb. 14, 2017), http://publicherald.org/to-hell-with-us-records-ofmisconduct-found-inside-pa-drinking-water-investigations/
[https://perma.cc/4L3GCXQ2] [hereinafter Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct].
13
See Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety
Should Trump Corporate Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1162 (2018).
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into the definition of a trade secret.14 Ultimately, this Note
concludes that Zink’s approach, coupled with identical changes to
state law, is the preferable course of action.
I. BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND EXTENT OF “FRACKING” IN THE
UNITED STATES:
A. What is Fracking?
Hydraulic fracturing, known as “fracking,” is a method of
drilling for oil and gas.15 In the initial drilling stage, it is exactly
the same as what would happen in any normal oil or gas well: the
wellbore16 is drilled and a concrete casing is placed around it so
that the fracking process itself can begin.17 Once this is complete,
the first “acid stage” involves injecting acid and water down the
well bore to clear any cement debris from the earlier casing
process and to open a conduit for the fracking fluids which will
eventually be pumped down the well.18 Next, in the “pad” stage,
massive volumes of water are mixed with proppants, usually sand,
and specialized chemicals.19 The mixed fluids are subjected to
extreme pressures as they are pumped into the oil and gas
formation which breaks apart fractures in the rock.20 While
approximately 99% of the solution pumped down is comprised of
water and sand, the volumes used are so high that the process still
involves thousands of gallons of chemical additives, even if those

14

See S.B. 299, 65th Sess. (Mont. 2017) (enacted); see also Zink, supra note 13, at
1177–80.
15
See MarathonOilCorp., Animation of Hydraulic Fracturing (fracking), YOUTUBE
(Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VY34PQUiwOQ [https://perma.cc
/DQ44-RBAV].
16
See
Wellbore,
COLLINS DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com
/us/dictionary/english/wellbore [https://perma.cc/547R-Q3MN] (A wellbore is “a hole
drilled in the ground in order to look for or extract natural resources such as oil or gas.”).
17
See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY,
http://fracfocus.org/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process
[https://perma.cc/T7HM-M5UC].
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See id.
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chemicals make up less than 1% of the overall solution.21 In the
subsequent phase of fracking, called the “prop sequence stage”,
successive stages of water and proppant material are pumped into
the well in order to hold the new fractures open so that oil or gas
(depending on the formation) can flow out.22 This stage also
utilizes “several hundred thousand gallons of water” laced with
chemicals.23 Lastly, in the final “flushing’ stage”, more water is
used to clear the well and remaining proppants.24
This entire process is only to “frack” a specific portion of each
well; after each is done, the section is then plugged and the entire
process is repeated between four and twenty times on each section
of the well.25 At the completion of the entire fracking process, each
of the plugs are removed and a surge of pressurized fluid
containing oil or gas, fracking chemical additives, and potentially
radioactive compounds that were contained in the underground
formation flow up the well in a process called “flowback”.26 Such
flowback is typically treated and then either reused by the fracking
company or disposed of through release to surface waters, storage
in open ponds, or injection deep underground.27 As discussed infra,
almost every aspect of this process poses some level of
environmental concern.
Furthermore, the actual fracking process used for each
particular well varies based on unique characteristics of that rock
21

See id.; see also Lauren Donovan, Killdeer Oil Spill Being Cleaned Up, Officials
Investigate, BISMARCK TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2010), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-andregional/article_af6a8bd2-b712-11df-b4ff-001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/M6JQC2DZ] (describing a 2010 “blowout” that occurred in Kildeer, ND when Sanjel Corp.
was conducting the fifth stage of a 19-stage “frack” with each stage “injecting 370,000
gallons of water and gel chemicals at 8,000 pounds per square inch.”).
22
See FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17.
23
Id.
24
See Kellie Fisher, Communities in The Dark: The Use of State Sunshine Laws to
Shed Light on the Fracking Industry, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 99, 103 (2015); see
also MarathonOilCorp., supra note 15.
25
See Fisher, supra note 24, at 103–04.
26
See id.
27
See Brie D. Sherwin, Chocolate, Coca-Cola, and Fracturing Fluid: A Story of
Unfettered Secrecy, Toxicology, and the Resulting Public Health Implications of Natural
Gas Development, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 602 (2016); see also Fisher, supra note 24, at
104.
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formation and tends to differ even from well to well within the
same formation.28 Because each zone of oil or gas is essentially
unique, each well needs a fracking “design tailored to the
particular conditions of the formation.”29 Thus, the fracking
process overall typically remains constant, while a range of
different chemical additives and sequences are adjusted to
maximize energy recovery from the well.30 This complicated
aspect of fracking has arguably made the process harder to pin
down and regulate and has also complicated the process of
disclosing the chemicals used in each well.
B. Fracking’s History: Why It Is Used So Widely, and the Extent
of Its Use
While hydraulic fracturing is actually decades old, it has
recently become a key tool for oil and gas extraction in essentially
every setting. This is because the process not only increases the
amount of oil and gas that can be extracted from “mature” wells
that have already been pumping fossil fuels out for years, but also
creates the opportunity to economize the extraction of energy from
new, previously untapped “unconventional” settings, such as shale
and tight gas and oil sands.31 The fracking process was originally
developed for commercial use by Stanolind Oil (the forerunner of
Amoco) in order to help extract additional oil from wells with

28

See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 37–38.
FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17.
30
See id.
31
See Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an
Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH. 27 (2010); see also MARY TIEMANN & ADAM
VANN, CONG. RES. SERV., PUB. NO. R41760, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SAFE
DRINKING WATER ACT REGULATORY ISSUES 2–3 (2015) (defining “unconventional”
settings as ones with “low permeability” which were previously not economical to
produce without hydraulic fracturing); DUSTY HORWITT, KEYSTONE SECRETS: RECORDS
SHOW WIDESPREAD USE OF SECRET FRACKING CHEMICALS IS A LOOMING RISK FOR
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN, PA COMMUNITIES 7, P’SHIP FOR POLICY INTEGRITY (Sept. 11,
2018),
https://www.pfpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/PASecretFracking
ChemicalsReportPFPI9.10.2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AKK2-QKDD]
(defining
“unconventional” oil and gas settings as “a well drilled into any formation (coal,
sandstone, shale, or other material) in which natural gas or oil can be extracted in
economic qualities only with hydraulic fracturing, often in combination with horizontal
drilling.”) (emphasis in original).
29
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declining productivity in the 1930s and 1940s.32 In 1949,
Halliburton was given the exclusive patent to use this technology
and drilled the first successful commercial well that same year.33
However, fracking did not gain much attention until companies
began using it in shale gas34 settings around 1998.35 Moreover, the
true ‘explosion’ of fracking did not happen until 2008 when the
Marcellus Shale, a huge reservoir of shale gas underlying
Pennsylvania and its neighboring states, was targeted.36
However, government support played a crucial role: shale gas
production via fracking was only rendered profitable by millions of
dollars of federal research and tax breaks.37 Without crucial
breakthroughs that resulted from government research, such as
horizontal drilling, the fracking “shale” boom would have never
been possible.38 For instance, between 1978 and 1992, the U.S.
Department of Energy (“DOE”) invested $137 million in its
“Eastern Gas Shale Program” which showcased many of the
hydraulic fracturing and advanced drilling techniques that are
currently in use in shale gas fields today.39 Moreover, between the
1970s and 1990s, the DOE funded crucial research and
development through its National Energy Technology Lab
program which resulted in breakthroughs such as directional

32

See Montgomery & Smith, supra note 31, at 27.
See
id.;
Fracturing
Fluid
Systems,
HALLIBURTON
(2013),
https://www.halliburton.com/content/dam/ps/public/pe/contents/Data_Sheets/web/H/H05
667.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6EG-QT78].
34
See FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17 (explaining that tight
shale rock formations were a type of formation that geologists previously thought were
impossible to produce before the onset of fracking).
35
See David Bahnsen, An Anniversary of History Being Made: The Birth of Modern
Fracking, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidbahnsen1
/2018/08/08/an-anniversary-of-history-being-made/#c6b9a8d3b34f
[https://perma.cc/S455-6TRG].
36
See Cramer, supra note 9, at 70.
37
See Kevin Begos, Tax Breaks, U.S. Research Play Big Part in Success of Fracking,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 24, 2012, 11:29 AM), https://www.cleveland.com
/nation/index.ssf/2012/09/tax_breaks_us_research_play_bi.html [https://perma.cc/TGG8PGFA]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF OIL & NAT. GAS, UNCONVENTIONAL OIL
AND GAS RESOURCES (July 2016).
38
See Begos, supra note 37.
39
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF OIL & NAT. GAS, supra note 37.
33
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drilling and micro-seismic monitoring.40 A concrete example of
this effect is the use of micro-seismic monitoring throughout the
fracking process. This technology, originally developed to track
Russian submarines during the Cold War, was repurposed for use
in unconventional gas settings to closely track the fracking
process.41 Furthermore, the initial joint ventures with private
entities were heavily subsidized by the DOE and tax breaks have
since continued to render the practice profitable.42
Therefore, it is safe to say that government investment in
research, development, and tax breaks, coupled with private sector
innovation, led to fracking’s widespread use today which has
ultimately had a profound impact on America’s energy
independence by opening up huge sources of previously
unavailable energy sitting right beneath our feet.43 Yet, although
much of the research conducted by the government seems to be
unrelated to chemicals used in the process, the robust role that the
federal government played in creating today’s shale fracking boom
somewhat undermines the notion that these processes are
proprietary and potentially deserving of trade secret protection. For
instance, an oilfield owner doesn’t simply hire Halliburton over
one of its competitors because they utilize a particular fracking
chemical; instead, they also do so because they want access to
Halliburton’s range of non-chemical technologies, which include
micro-seismic monitoring entirely derived from government
research. This notion of government support also further
undermines the current regulatory landscape for fracking, since the
country is now essentially allowing a force it created through
subsidies, research, and tax breaks to harm its environment and the
health of its citizens. Given the strong incentives that the
government provided to get the industry off on its feet, it is hardly
unreasonable to argue that the government should be able to decide

40

See id.
See Begos, supra note 37.
42
See id. Importantly, however, some of this DOE money also went into the creation
of FRACFocus, the fracking chemical disclosure registry. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
OFF. OF OIL & NAT. GAS, supra note 37.
43
See Bahnsen, supra note 35.
41
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the proper “regulation point”, particularly in the trade secrets
context.
Yet, despite serious public health informational issues lingering
below the surface, hydraulic fracturing has become almost
ubiquitous in America. Industry experts estimate that between 60
and 80% of all wells drilled in the United States will be fracked at
some point, and a 2016 EPA report concluded that approximately
275,000 wells were fracked between 2000 and 2013.44
Furthermore, a recent study by the Partnership for Policy Integrity
(“PFPI”) that focused on Pennsylvania concluded that secret
fracking chemicals were injected into approximately 2,515 of the
state’s wells between 2013 to 2017, which comprised 55% of the
total; however, due to the state’s weak and under-enforced fracking
regulations, discussed at length infra, PFPI also estimated that
these numbers were likely vast under-estimates.45
Pennsylvania is probably also the most controversial, and
perhaps important place where fracking is happening on a
widespread scale. This is because the Marcellus Shale underlying
Pennsylvania is essentially the “epicenter” of the fracking “boom”,
the Delaware River basin in the state’s northeastern corner feeds
drinking water to the New York City metropolitan region, and
investigators have discovered severe occurrences of “regulatory
capture” there.46 Regulatory capture is a process under which the
very regulators who are supposed to be protecting the public
become beholden to the entities that they are supposed to regulate
and thus the priorities of the regulated industry become paramount
to those of the public at large.47 Recent reports have demonstrated
how it has happened in fracking at the state level in
Pennsylvania.48
44

See FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17; U.S. EPA, OFF. OF
RES. & DEV., 600/R-16/236F,HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL & GAS: IMPACTS FROM
THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE U.
S. (2016).
45
See HORWITT, supra note 31, at 4.
46
See id. at 5; see also Cramer, supra note 9.
47
Regulatory Capture – Definition and Meaning, MARKET BUSINESS NEWS (2019),
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/regulatory-capture-definitionmeaning/ [https://perma.cc/3H8G-4PHW].
48
See Troutman et al., Public Herald Impact, supra note 12.
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A 2017 report by the Public Herald which examined
complaints made to state regulators found that environmental
damage in the state was both severe and widespread.49 That report
highlighted how almost every single municipality in western and
northern Pennsylvania (the main areas where fracking is happening
in the state) had at least one complaint to state regulators.50
However, the report also revealed that dozens of those same
municipalities reported thirty or more complaints and some areas
even reported over one hundred complaints.51 Significantly, the
report also showed a chart which demonstrated a direct correlation
between the number of wells drilled and the number of complaints
filed with the state regulatory agency.52 Yet, both fracking
companies and ‘captured’ state regulators like those in
Pennsylvania continue to assert that hydraulic fracturing is
completely safe and should not be further regulated.53
FIGURE 154:

49
50
51
52
53
54

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. (depicting chart featured below).
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 13.
Originally published in Troutman et al., Public Herald Impact, supra note 12.
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FIGURE 255:

C. Environmental Concerns and the Federal Regulatory Vacuum
Although its minimally regulated, fracking poses a multitude of
environmental threats to ground and surface water and these
dangers are ultimately amplified by the current questionable use of
privacy and trade secret law by the industry. The first concern
stems from the fracking process itself, which can allow fracking
fluids and gases that the process releases to seep into otherwise
safe sources of groundwater.56 An EPA report stretching back to
1987, long before the shale boom, found groundwater
contamination as a result of nearby fracking operations in West
Virginia.57 Furthermore, a 2011 study of Northeastern
Pennsylvania found significant evidence of widespread methane

55

Id.
See Fisher, supra note 24, at 104.
57
See U.S. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE
EXPLORATION, DEV., AND PROD. OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL
ENERGY IV–22, vol. 1 (1987), https://archive.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special
/web /pdf/530sw88003a.pdf [https://perma.cc/42UZ-2363].
56
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contamination of drinking water.58 Although methane did naturally
occur in 85% of the water wells in the region, the study found that
concentrations of methane in groundwater were substantially
higher—approximately seventeen times higher on average—in
areas where unconventional natural gas extraction was
happening.59 The study ultimately concluded that landowners
should get independent water tests on their wells before any
fracking begins.60 Lastly, especially in truly “unconventional” oil
or gas settings such as the Marcellus Shale, a final concern about
fracking is that most of the fluid remains underground.61 News
reports have described interviews with fracking company officials
and industry experts and concluded that generally less than 40% of
the fluid used in a fracking operation is recovered, with 20% being
typical.62 The remaining 60–80% is left underground in the same
“tight” shale formations where it is injected and can continue to be
a source of negative environmental impacts in the future.
Numerous studies have also revealed two other concerns
associated with fracking. As can happen with any type of oil or gas
well, the concrete casing on the well can fail and fracking fluids
can seep into adjacent groundwater or the drill itself could
accidentally impact groundwater and similarly contaminate that
reservoir.63 These possibilities have been confirmed by both
58

See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking
Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172 (2011).
59
See id. at 8173.
60
See id. at 8176.
61
See Abrahm Lustgarten, In New Gas Wells, More Drilling Chemicals Remain
Underground, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2009, 8:12 AM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/new-gas-wells-leave-more-chemicals-in-ground-hydraulic-fracturing
[https://perma.cc/CB29-MYPK].
62
See id. For instance, one report estimated that for each well drilled in the Marcellus
shale, over “3 million gallons of chemically tainted wastewater could be left in the
ground forever” and that, even if the chemicals make up less than 1% of that fluid, the
chemicals alone still comprise “34,000 gallons” for each well; see also Barry
Stevens, The Facts about Fracking Fluid and its Disposal, OILPRICE.COM (May 23, 2012,
10:12 PM), https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Facts-about-Fracking-Fluidand-its-Disposal.html [https://perma.cc/BJE4-LP8F].
63
See Wendy Koch, Study: Faulty Gas Wells, Not Fracking, Pollute Water, USA
TODAY (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014
/09/15/faulty-gas-well-pollute-water/15631955/ [https://perma.cc/L9RL-S9WH].
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independent studies in the Marcellus Shale and the 2016 EPA
report on fracking.64 Furthermore, there is also a large risk that the
chemicals themselves or the flow-back which results from fracking
could be spilled either on the way to or from the drill site or when
the fracking wastewater is disposed of in surface waters without
being adequately treated.65 A salient example of how this is
actually occurring comes from XTO Energy, a fracking company
with a bad record of environmental stewardship. In 2013, the
federal government fined XTO for negligent actions in 2010 that
led to toxic waste continually flowing into the Susquehanna River
for over two months; in fact, this was standard operating practice
for XTO, who at that time had already received one hundred and
seventy-nine safety violations for just twenty-five of the
company’s wells in Pennsylvania, even though they operated many
more in the state.66 XTO’s behavior, along with the 2014
Halliburton spill in Monroe County, OH, make it clear that these
environmental harms are much more reality than speculation.67
Moreover, recent 2018 SEC filings of key hydraulic fracturing
companies confirm the continued prevalence of these issues. For
instance, Range Resources felt the need to inform its investors of
the material risk of “uncontrollable flows of oil, natural gas, or
well fluids.”68 In the same vein, Noble Energy notified the public
that “possible underground migration of hydrocarbons and

64

See Thomas H. Darrah et al., Noble Gases Identify the Mechanisms of Fugitive Gas
Contamination in Drinking-Water Wells Overlying the Marcellus and Barnett Shales,
PNAS (2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/111/39/14076.full.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X2BF-AFBZ]; U.S. EPA, OFF. OF RES. & DEV., supra note 44.
65
See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 602.
66
See Susan Phillips, EPA Fines XTO Energy for Lycoming County Frack Water
Spills, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 17, 2013, 5:54 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org
/pennsylvania/2013/07/18/epa-fines-xto-energy-for-lycoming-county-frack-water-spills/
[https://perma.cc/YA8D-K6RW]. XTO was further fined by the EPA in 2014 for Clean
Water Act violations when it intentionally dumped material in wetlands and streams at
eight West Virginia sites. Susan Phillips, Feds Fine Marcellus Driller XTO $2.3 Million,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 22, 2014, 6:35 PM) [hereinafter Phillips, Feds Fine Marcellus
Driller], https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/12/22/feds-fine-marcellus-drillerxto-2-3-million/ [https://perma.cc/BBK4-QKNA].
67
See Phillips, Feds Fine Marcellus Driller, supra note 66; see also Blake, supra note
5.
68
RANGE RESOURCES CORP., ANN. REP. (FORM 10-K) (2018), at 29.
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chemicals” was a key ongoing concern for that business.69
Furthermore, Halliburton apprised its investors that it faces a risk
of “potential pre-injection spills or releases of stored fracturing
fluids and potential spills or releases of fuel or other fluids.”70 Yet,
despite classifying these concerns as material risks to their
businesses, whenever these environmental issues actually occur,
fracking companies use trade secrets, confidential settlements, and
other forms of questionable privacy law to protect the true identity
of the chemicals and toxins to which the public is being exposed.71
Unfortunately, given the serious risks described above, both
current federal and state regulations are inadequate. One of the
fundamental underlying policies behind the idea of environmental
protection in this country is that the public has a right to know
certain things, such as basic health information about substances
and compounds to which our citizens are being exposed.72 When
regulations compel disclosure of such substances and health
studies thereof, the public can actually better protect themselves by
making an informed decision about whether or not they want to
voluntarily expose themselves to such a risk or if they would even
want to risk involuntary exposure.73 For fracking, this point is quite
salient since ostensibly non-existent federal regulation has left a
vacuum in which hydraulic fracturing companies have been able to
operate using potentially harmful chemicals without allowing the
public to study the potential health risks of such substances.74
On the federal side specifically, the most important law from
which fracking is exempted is the Safe Drinking Water Act
(“SDWA”).75 However, the process is also generally exempt from
the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the

69

NOBLE ENERGY, INC., ANN. REP. (FORM 10-K) (2018), at 50.
HALLIBURTON CO., ANN. REP. (FORM 10-K) (2018), at 4.
71
See Sherwin, supra, note 27, at 633.
72
See Melanie McCormick, Conflicting Theories at Play: Chemical Disclosure and
Trade Secrets in the New Federal Fracking Regulation, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J.
217, 223 (2016).
73
See id.
74
See generally Sherwin, supra note 27.
75
See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C (2012)).
70
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Clean Water Act (“CWA”) as well.76 The SDWA is the most
relevant federal law in this context because it was passed in 1974
with the articulated goal of preventing degradation of groundwater
drinking resources.77 Specifically, Part C of the SDWA governs
underground injection and places rigorous reporting and permitting
requirements on any entities falling within the Act’s definition.78
However, from 1974 to 1997, the EPA interpreted Part C of the
SDWA as inapplicable to fracking and only reversed its position
after the Eleventh Circuit ruled in LEAF v. EPA that the Agency’s
interpretation of the statute was unreasonable.79 Yet, in 2005,
under the ‘Energy Policy Act’, the SDWA was amended again in
order to specifically exempt fracking by changing the definition of
“underground injection” so as to exclude “fluids or propping
agents (other than diesel fuels).”80 Because that law was pushed
forward by the Bush administration and its Vice President, Dick
Cheney, who was Halliburton’s former CEO, the 2005 SDWA
amendment has become known colloquially as the “Halliburton
loophole.”81
Although there were prominent pushes to enhance regulations
on fracking during the Obama administration, almost none of those
reforms were accomplished or had any meaningful impact.82 The
76

See Fisher, supra note 24, at 107–08 (2015); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012)
(showing section of CWA that has a carve out for its definition of “pollutant” that does
not include something injected into a well to facilitate oil or gas production or for
disposal purposes so long as the relevant state has determined no further regulations are
necessary); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6921(b)(2)(A) (2012) (showing that the RCRA was amended in 1980 to exempt flowback disposal from the law).
77
See The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, §§ 121-126, 88 Stat.
1660, 1674–80 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h to 300h–5 (2012)).
78
See id.
79
See 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997).
80
Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 75. Interestingly, this exception mirrors the
same “carve-out” as the one used to exempt fracking from the RCRA. See generally
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, supra note 76.
81
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 24, at 106.
82
See, e.g., Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S.
1215, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to Senate Env’t and Pub. Works Comm.); H.R.
2766, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to the Subcomm. On Energy and Env’t);
Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 587, 112th Cong.
(2011) (did not pass); Fracking Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC
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most notable example is the 2015 BLM regulations promulgated
by the U.S. Department of the Interior.83 They were finalized rules
that would have regulated fracking similarly to the SDWA, except
only on public and Indian lands; however, those regulations were
enjoined from going into effect by the District court of Wyoming84
and the Trump administration subsequently rescinded the rule.85 In
fact, the reason the regulation was preliminarily struck down was
that the federal court recognized that fracking was essentially
exempt at the federal level and therefore, absent action by
Congress, the practice’s regulation was left to the states.86
D. State Level Regulations and the Use of Trade Secrets in
Fracking
The lack of federal environmental regulations makes state law
even more important, not only because it is the chief method of
holding fracking companies accountable, but also because trade
secret law is principally a state matter. As exemplified by
Pennsylvania, state regulations are typically too lax by giving too
much trade secret protection; moreover, concerns abound that state
regulators have clearly been “captured” by the industry.
Halliburton summed up its view of the general regulatory
landscape in its 2018 annual SEC report by saying that “legislation
and/or regulations have been adopted in many states that
require . . . disclosure regarding chemicals used in . . . [fracking]
but that generally include protections for proprietary
information.”87 However, based on new state laws like the one

Act), S. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013) (did not pass); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE MINORITY STAFF, CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING 1 (2011).
83
See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg.
16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015); see also 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3–3 (rescinded).
84
See generally Wyoming v. United States DOI, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82132 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016).
85
See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, supra note 83;
Rescission of a 2015 Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,464 (July 25, 2017) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 3160).
86
See Wyoming, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82132 at *15.
87
HALLIBURTON CO., supra note 70, at 10 (emphasis added).
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recently passed in Montana, examined infra, there is hope that a
solution to the trade secrets issue may be in sight.88
Most states that do regulate fracking typically require some
form of chemical disclosure in order to get a permit to drill a new
well.89 A 2017 study on state level mandatory fracking fluid
disclosure laws looked at the eighteen states where hydraulic
fracturing is happening and being regulated and noted some basic
differences between them.90 The study noted that about six of the
states, including Pennsylvania, require the disclosures to be
reported to the FRACFocus online database partially funded by the
federal DOE, while other states like Wyoming and California
require reporting directly to the regulatory body in charge of
overseeing the practice.91 The rest of the states give the operator
the choice of whether or not to report to FRACFocus or state
regulators.92 What is required to be reported is generally the same
information, however, and typically comprises the ingredient
name, its Chemical Abstract Service (“CAS”) number (chemical
identifier), the maximum concentration of the chemical in the
fluid, and the supplier and trade name of the chemical, if
applicable.93
Most relevant here, all states currently let fracking companies
designate their disclosure as “trade secret” or “proprietary” when
the company believes that the product is deserving of trade secret
protection.94 After declaring the exemption from reporting these
products, the companies generally must still include the
concentration of the chemical used. However, they are able to
shield its name and chemical identification number; in other words,
the product’s underlying chemical ingredients.95 Some states also
88

See S.B. 299, supra note 14.
See Fisher, supra note 24, at 110.
90
See generally T. Robert Fetter, Fracking, Toxics, and Disclosure, DUKE UNIV.
ENERGY INITIATIVE (2017).
91
See id. at 6–7.
92
See id.
93
See id. at 7. In addition to information about the chemicals used, fracking companies
must also disclose the well location and name, the vertical depth drilled, the water
volume utilized, and the applicable latitude and longitude. See id.
94
See Fisher, supra note 24, at 110; see also HORWITT, supra note 31, at 7.
95
See Fetter, supra note 90, at 7.
89
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require operators to disclose the chemical family of the proprietary
substance.96 The end result of these disclosure regimes allows the
public to only learn about the overall concentrations of proprietary
chemicals used without any valuable information about the
chemicals themselves.97
Other important differences among state laws influence the
disclosure process. For instance, most states do not require
disclosure until the well itself has been fracked, yet a few states,
such as Texas, require disclosure as of the time that the permit to
drill is issued.98 Furthermore, the states typically vary as to
whether they require robust justifications for the trade secrets,
whether or not such secrets can be exposed to doctors or first
responders during emergencies, and other small differences.99
The general inadequacies of these state regulatory regimes can
be seen best in Pennsylvania’s current disclosure law and behavior
of its regulators. For instance, although Pennsylvania requires
reporting for the fracking process itself in unconventional settings
like the Marcellus Shale, it does not require reporting or disclosure
for the drilling process, for ‘conventional’ wells, or for chemical
manufacturers.100 Moreover, as originally written, the
Pennsylvania disclosure law included a “physician gag rule” that
the state’s Supreme Court recently struck down, to be discussed
infra.101
Another issue at the state level is the chronic under-staffing of
regulatory agencies.102 As the fracking “boom” accelerated
hydraulic fracturing quicker than states could afford to hire
additional well inspectors, in states like Pennsylvania, Ohio,
96

See id.
See id.
98
See id. at 8.
99
See McCormick, supra note 72, at 230.
100
See HORWITT, supra note 31, at 9–10 (emphasis added); see, e.g. 58 Pa.C.S. § 3203,
Definitions, “Well operator.”; 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222.1(b)(1); 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222.1(b)(9); 58
Pa.C.S. § 3222.1(d)(2)(ii).
101
See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 356, 569–77 (Pa. 2016)
102
Allison Grant, Drilling Inspectors Needed: Ohio looks to Hire as Shale Play
Spreads to More Counties, THE PLAIN DEALER (May 10, 2012, 5:20 AM), https://
www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/05/gas_drilling_inspectors_needed.html
[https://perma.cc/4546-SKBQ].
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Oklahoma, and Texas between the years 2009 and 2012, it was
commonplace for 60% or more of the wells to never be inspected
due to staffing shortages.103 For instance, in Pennsylvania, the state
maintained a staff of only eighty-four inspectors between 2009 and
2012, yet over 60,000 wells were operated during each of those
years; for that reason, regulators never inspected more than 35% of
the wells in the state during any specific year in that time period.104
Operating state regulatory agencies with such lean budgets
essentially has created an environment where fracking companies
police themselves.
In addition to dealing with staffing issues, according to the
2017 Public Herald report, the behavior of Pennsylvania’s
regulators has been objectively pro-industry in shielding fracking
companies from regulatory consequences.105 The report describes
how Pennsylvania regulators kept complaints of drinking water
contamination confidential and only released redacted versions
when state “right to know” requests were lodged.106 The report
found that since 2004, there were 4,108 water-related complaints,
out of 9,442 overall complaints and 10,027 wells drilled in the
state.107 However, despite the fact that the common thread uniting
these complaints was that they were all located adjacent to
unconventional shale fracking sites, Pennsylvania’s regulators
concluded that only 6% of the water complaints were actually
related to oil and gas.108 In the view of the Public Herald, the state
agency responsible for handling these complaints “either broke the
law or acted wrongfully or negligently in failing to properly
investigate or enforce the law in 178” of these cases.109 These
findings typify the weak state regulatory landscape for fracking.
However, environmental laws are only one part of the problem;
trade secret laws are the other. Although there is some relevant
federal legislation that applies as well, trade secret law is
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id.
See Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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principally a state law matter. At common law, misappropriation of
trade secrets was a tort.110 Thus, the first Restatement of Torts
listed six variables that factored into whether certain information,
in the context of a misappropriation claim, constituted a trade
secret111:
(1) the extent to which the information is known
outside the claimant’s business;
(2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the claimant
to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the business
and its competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by
the business in developing the information; and,
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information can be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.
The standard still essentially weighs those same factors today,
where most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“UTSA”), a model law created to harmonize state trade secrets
law that has mostly succeeded in that goal.112 The UTSA defines a
trade secret as “information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that”
both “derives independent economic value” from not being known
or “readily ascertainable by proper means” by others “who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use” and is “subject
110

See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939).
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1939).
112
See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005);
James McQuade, Kayla Delgado, and Daniel Corbett, Massachusetts Enacts New
Reforms on Noncompetes, Becomes 49th State to Enact UTSA, ORRICK (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2018/08/28/massachusetts-enacts-newreforms-on-noncompetes-becomes-49th-state-to-enact-utsa/#more-2559
[https://perma.cc/8Y29-3WMK] (describing how as of publication, 49 out of 50 states
had adopted the UTSA, with only New York holding out). For those who do successfully
demonstrate an improper misappropriation, the UTSA makes either injunctive or
monetary relief available. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2–3 (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 538 (2005).
111
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to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.”113 Under that
incredibly broad definition, fracking fluids theoretically qualify for
trade secret protection because they are formulas, kept confidential
by chemical and fracking companies in order to maintain an edge
over competitors, and have an independent economic value.114
The two main relevant federal laws in the trade secret context
are the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) and the Defend Trade
Secrets Act (“DTSA”).115 Passed in 1996, the EEA was intended to
be a federal bulwark against foreign trade secret appropriation,
particularly via new tools like the internet.116 Unfortunately, the
EEA was ineffective as there were very few prosecutions under
it.117 Therefore, in 2016, Congress acted again and passed the
DTSA, which was intended to strengthen federal trade secret
protections further and was somewhat modeled off of the UTSA.118
For our analysis, however, the most significant aspect of the DTSA
is that it does not pre-empt state law, and therefore any solution to
the public health vs. trade secrets dilemma that is solved by
amending the DTSA (or EEA for that matter) will also need to
involve amending state laws, such as the UTSA.119
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, held that a property right exists in a trade secret,
specifically in the holder’s right to exclude others from using that
113

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
See McCormick, supra note 72, at 222.
115
See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)); Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (2012) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2016)).
116
See Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 1831(a)(1); see also David S. Levine &
Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA At One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 114–15
(2018).
117
See Levine & Seaman, supra note 116, at 114–15. Specifically, the DTSA was
intended to fight against state-actor hacking entities like Russia and China and allowed
trade secret owners to bring a civil action for trade secret misappropriation in Federal
court. Id. at 115, 117. The more controversial aspects of the DTSA, areas where it
significantly differs from the UTSA, are its ex parte seizure remedy and the fact that it
only provides limited protection for whistleblowers. Id. at 119; see also Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2016, supra note 115.
118
See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016; see also Levine & Seaman, supra
note 116, at 119.
119
See Zink, supra note 13, at 1180.
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trade secret.120 This case is an interesting parallel to the fracking
fluid chemical disclosure debate. Regulating the use of pesticides,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”)
authorized the EPA to use data from earlier applications for
pesticides covered under the law in order to evaluate subsequent
applications.121 In 1978, the law was amended to allow public
disclosure of information used in FIFRA applications, even if they
were considered trade secrets, if such data pertained to “health,
safety, and environmental data . . . [and only if handed over] to
qualified requesters.”122 Monsanto then sued and claimed that this
public disclosure of its trade secrets in its FIFRA applications was
a taking without just compensation in violation of the 5th
Amendment.123 Although at the core of the holding is the idea that
a trade secret comprises a property right, the Supreme Court also
held that no taking occurred for the portion of data that Monsanto
disclosed after the 1978 amendment because Monsanto was “aware
of the conditions under which the data [was to be] submitted, and
the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate government
interest,” namely, ensuring that pesticides do not harm humans or
the environment.124 Because Monsanto chose to risk disclosure in
order to receive the benefit of being licensed under FIFRA, they
lost this post-1978 takings claim.125 Therefore, Ruckelshaus retains
importance in the fracking context. Theoretically a law requiring
disclosure of health information about fracking fluids, similar to
the amended FIFRA, could be passed and so long as it meets the
limitations laid out above and so long as it concerns a licensing
process to which companies could opt-in, it would not affect the
fracking companies’ property rights in those proprietary
chemicals.126

120

See 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding that Monsanto was entitled to compensation
for the government making its insecticide trade secrets public pursuant to a law passed by
Congress that determined that it was beneficial to publish the trade secrets when deciding
whether certain pesticides should be permitted).
121
See id. at 992.
122
Id. at 995–96.
123
See id. at 998–99.
124
Id. at 1007.
125
See id.
126
Cf. id. at 1007–08.
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II. IMPROPER USES OF PRIVACY IN FRACKING
A. Reported Water Contamination Incidents
As mentioned, fracking companies like Halliburton commonly
claim that the practice is entirely safe despite the fact that issues all
over the country have abounded; therefore, this section will
investigate some of the known incidents.127 To document the
fracking contamination phenomenon, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (“NRDC”) created a database in 2014 which
showed that up to that point that there were at least 36 cases of
publicized groundwater contamination.128 One important incident
dates back to the dawn of the fracking boom in 2008 in
Colorado.129 One day that April, nurse Cathy Behr was working in
the emergency room when a “gas patch” worker covered in a
“sweet smelling” fracking chemical called ZetaFlow™ arrived for
treatment after a “drilling accident.”130 Behr helped the worker
remove his clothing and clean the chemicals off which resulted in
her breathing them in.131 Next, Behr lost her sense of smell, her
vision went blurry, and then her heart, liver, and respiratory
systems went into a near-fatal failure.132 What makes this incident
so egregious is what happened next: Weatherford, the producer of
ZetaFlow®, refused to give the doctor treating Behr any
information about the product, citing trade secrets.133
The secret nature of these fracking chemicals effects harmed
landowners in a myriad of ways. While the fracking boom has
127

See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 13.
See Amy Mall, Incidents Where Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of
Drinking Water Contamination, NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/amy-mall/incidents-where-hydraulic-fracturing-suspectedcause-drinking-water-contamination [https://perma.cc/JV9Z-QG3Y].
129
See Susan Greene, Oil Secret Has Nasty Side Effect, DENV. POST (July 24, 2008,
2:24 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2008/07/23/oil-secret-has-nasty-side-effect/
[https://perma.cc/JG4T-68FB].
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.; see also ZetaFlow® Sand-Conglomeration Services, WEATHERFORD (2016),
https://www.weatherford.com/en/documents/brochure/products-andservices/completions/zetaflow-sand-conglomeration-services/ [https://perma.cc/4WJQEGEH].
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frequently been marketed as a means of economic selfadvancement for struggling rural areas, actual evidence shows that
is not always the case.134 On this point, the 2009 story of George
Zimmerman in Pennsylvania is notable.135 Part of Zimmerman’s
story remains public because he sued Atlas Energy Inc., claiming
that the company had poisoned his water and 480 acres of land
with toxic chemicals.136 In order to make a legal case, water tests
are essential, both before and after fracking has begun, but they are
also very cost prohibitive; Zimmerman spent $15,000 on water
tests alone.137 However, in Zimmerman’s case, the water tests
showed direct evidence of groundwater contamination, since the
water was polluted with seven known carcinogens after fracking
began but original baseline tests showed that the water’s quality
before fracking was “perfect.”138 Additionally, the oil and gas
companies, as they commonly do, could not claim that the
carcinogens were naturally occurring, since the contaminating
substances found were artificial.139
Though it was three years later in 2012, the story of the
Leightons, also in Pennsylvania, mirrors the Zimmerman’s
experience.140 In an arbitration filing that became public, the
Leightons described how an addendum to their natural gas lease
required Chesapeake Appalachia (and its agents Nomac and
Schlumberger) to correct any harms to their water supply based on
the fracking activities happening on their land.141 Like in the case
of Zimmerman, water samples were done both before and after
fracking and showed that negligent construction of the well had led
contaminants to leak into adjacent groundwater for over a week;
134

See John Craven, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade Secret Protection in
Hydraulic Fracturing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395, 399 (2014).
135
See Jon Hurdle, Pennsylvania Lawsuit Says Drilling Polluted Water, REUTERS (Nov.
9, 2009, 1:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fracking-suit/pennsylvanialawsuit-says-drilling-polluted-water-idUSTRE5A80PP20091109
[https://perma.cc/9DBQ-6438].
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
Id.
139
See id.
140
Compare id. with Leighton v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 1:13-CV-2018, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167802 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2013).
141
See Leighton, supra note 140, at 4.
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after that, the water showed high levels of methane, smelled
terrible, was no longer clear, and became flammable.142 Because
most similarly effected landowners as Leighton and Zimmerman
likely would not have had the capital to conduct water tests to
actually prove contamination, these cases demonstrate how
Pennsylvania’s inadequate state regulation have allowed the
fracking companies to essentially “bully” affected landowners.143
Without the proper scientific tools to prove contamination and with
many of the pollutants hidden as trade secrets, it seems likely that
the “captured” Pennsylvania regulators, whenever affected parties
made complaints of contamination, simply found that there was no
evidence of it and refused to take action.144
The vast impact and effectiveness of fracking companies’ use
of privacy and information law is perhaps best understood in the
fact that no plaintiff has ever successfully proven or been awarded
damages based on harms done by fracking.145 Thus far in the
history of the U.S. legal system, only two plaintiffs have come
close: one was in the Parr v. Aruba Petroleum case in Texas,
where a jury found that the defendant’s fracking operations
adjacent to the plaintiff’s land and residence justified a $3 million
verdict for the plaintiff.146 Interestingly, the plaintiff’s claim was
not for violation of a state environmental law or for some other
scientifically-proven damage; instead, the plaintiff made its case
based on intentional nuisance.147 In fact, the court found that all of
the plaintiff’s other fracking-related claims could not be proven
since there was not enough scientific evidence.148 This result is
142

See id. AT 6.
See Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12.
144
See generally id.
145
Cf. David Blackmon, Parr v. Aruba – The Fracking Case That Wasn’t, FORBES
(June 3, 2014, 6:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2014/06/03/parrv-aruba-the-fracking-case-that-wasnt/ [https://perma.cc/EZ5U-GYVT]; see also Daniel
M. Krainen & Mackenzie S. Schoonmaker, Dallas Jury Awards Nearly $3 Million in
First U.S. Toxic Tort Verdict Related to Fracking, NAT’L LAW REVIEW (July 28, 2014),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dallas-jury-awards-nearly-3-million-first-us-toxictort-verdict-related-to-fracking [https://perma.cc/L9AU-CSLT].
146
See Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC-11-01650-E, 2014 WL 1996882 at 1–2
(Tex. 2014).
147
See id.
148
See id.
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exactly why fracking companies are so aggressive in preventing
the public from learning anything about their toxic substances, so
that plaintiffs affected by them have no case to make at trial. Even
worse for the plaintiff in Parr, an appellate court recently
overturned the jury award entirely on the basis that even the
intentional nuisance claim lacked sufficient evidence to justify the
large verdict.149
The other plaintiffs who came close were a group of
homeowners in Dimock, Pennsylvania in Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas
Corp, who alleged that Cabot’s fracking operations poisoned their
groundwater.150 The plaintiffs in Ely also made out their case of
damages in nuisance, and a unanimous eight person jury in
Scranton, Pennsylvania awarded the nine plaintiffs a $4.24M
verdict.151 However, that jury finding was subsequently vacated by
a federal magistrate judge, who said that there were severe
“weaknesses” in the case including a lack of clear scientific
evidence for the verdict.152
B. Confidential Settlements: The Norm
The alleged groundwater contamination in Dimock,
Pennsylvania affected the entire town153 and the Ely plaintiffs
began as a group of over forty residents.154 This number dwindled
down to nine plaintiffs by the time of the trial because of a
confidential settlement.155 A landmark article written in Bloomberg
149

See Aruba Petroleum, Inc. v. Parr, No. 05-14-01285-CV, 2017 WL 462340 at 7
(Tex. App. 2017).
150
Civil No. 3:09-CV-2284 (M.D. Pa Mar. 31, 2017); see also Timothy Cama, Judge
Overturns $4.2M Award in Alleged Fracking Pollution Case, THE HILL, (Mar. 31, 2017,
4:56 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/326784-judge-overturns-424maward-in-alleged-fracking-pollution-case [https://perma.cc/M4QL-7TNJ].
151
Cama, supra note 150.
152
See id.
153
GASLAND (New Video Group 2010).
154
Cama, supra note 150.
155
Cama, supra note 150. It is likely that the public never learned about the resolution
of the Zimmerman and Leighton cases, discussed supra, because the cases were settled,
and in return for compensation for the environmental harms done to those plaintiffs, the
companies demanded their post-settlement silence. Cf. Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra
note 11; see also Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.), Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00474-JLH
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissal with prejudice upon out of court settlement).
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broke open this aspect of the fracking story in 2013,156 and
described how fracking companies, prompted either by a lawsuit
being filed against them or a complaint lodged against them with a
regulatory body, will commonly settle with those affected and
frequently buy out their land as well.157 It should also be noted that
using confidential settlements is not limited to the fracking context
whatsoever; rather, it is a practice commonly used in various
industries wherever there are risks of repeat litigation against the
same party.158
One reason that the companies demand silence in return for
settlement is that by keeping the settlement amounts secret, the
lawyers for these companies maintain an advantage over plaintiff’s
attorneys, who are unaware what the “market rate” is for such a
settlement and thus exploit this advantage to minimally pay for the
environmental damage caused.159 However, the more prominent
reason confidentiality is so important to fracking companies
pertains to public relations. Fracking companies want to be able to
appear as clean as possible to the regulatory bodies in charge of
issuing the permits necessary to engage in fracking and therefore
silencing landowners and community members who are affected
allows them to maintain that appearance of cleanliness.160 From a
public health standpoint, however, this practice is exceedingly
problematic because it puts the individuals responsible for
protecting public health, those same regulators, as well as scientists
and researchers, in an inferior informational position.161
An interesting Pennsylvania case which did eventually become
public is Hallowich.162 Because the settlement there also involved
156

See generally Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11.
See id.; see also Kevin Begos, Some States Confirm Water Pollution from Oil, Gas
Drilling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 5, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://old.seattletimes.com
/html/businesstechnology/2022603080_apxgasdrillingwatercontamination.html
[https://perma.cc/8CMG-3VUY] (describing hundreds of such regulatory complaints
filed in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia).
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See R. Kyle Alagood, Settlement Confidentiality: A “Fracking” Disaster for Public
Health and Safety, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10459, 10460, 10464 (2015).
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See Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11.
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See Alagood, supra note 158, at 10460.
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See id.
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See Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11.
157

1000

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:971

the affected family’s minor children, the court was required to sign
off on it.163 Yet, even those court hearings and the results of them
were initially maintained under court seal as confidential.164
However, after environmental groups and newspapers challenged
to have them unsealed, the court reversed years later and unsealed
the order.165 The public thus learned that the Hallowich family,
including its minor children, agreed to be paid $750,000 in return
for their land and for never speaking about fracking or the
Marcellus Shale again publicly.166 Their lawyer describes objecting
to the silencing of the children but how he wasn’t in a realistic
position to negotiate the terms since the deal was a “take it or leave
it situation.”167 Furthermore, the Bloomberg article makes it clear
that such “take it or leave it” confidential settlements are standard
fracking industry practice.168 Overall, these stories paint a vivid
picture of the lengths to which fracking companies will go to keep
the identity of their products and the environmental and health
damage that they cause secret, even if it hurts the public.169
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See id.
See generally Tr. of In-Chambers Proceeding, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No.
2010-3954 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 23, 2011).
165
See generally Order Unsealing Records, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 20103954 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 20, 2013).
166
See Tr. of In-Chambers Proceeding at 5, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 20103954 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 23, 2011).
167
Id. at 10.
168
See Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11. For instance, Aruba Petroleum in Texas
settled and bought the land of the Ruggieros, just as Royal Dutch Shell did with the
Richardsons in Pennsylvania. Id. Similarly, Chesapeake Energy bought out three separate
families in Terry Township, Pennsylvania. Id. Moreover, the industry successfully
silenced Laura Amos, a woman who was once an anti-fracking activist in Colorado. Id.
After fracking began near Amos’s home, her water well exploded and she later got a rare
form of cancer. Id. Scientific studies showed that rats developed this rare cancer after
exposure to the toxic substance 2-BE, which Amos alleged was in her water well due to
fracking company Encana’s negligence. Id. Yet, after entering into a confidentiality
settlement with Encana, Amos was subpoenaed by the Colorado Oil and Gas commission
to discuss the potential for new stronger fracking regulations; however, Encana
threatened to sue Amos and void the settlement agreement if she spoke and this tactic
worked to force her silence. Id.
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See generally Alagood, supra note 158.
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C. Documented Adverse Health Effects in Pennsylvania:
Three recent studies, dating to 2015 and 2017 and conducted in
Pennsylvania, confirm the fears about fracking expressed by many
environmental groups and activists: namely, that fracking is not
healthy for humans or animals. The first study, centered on
Washington County, PA, examined the health effects of 492
residents who used ground-fed water wells. The study concluded
that the residents who lived within a kilometer of an
unconventional gas well reported adverse skin and upper
respiratory symptoms more frequently than those who lived further
away from natural gas wells.170 Another study that same year
focused on 15,000 births in Southwestern Pennsylvania: the study
concluded that the babies with the highest exposure to fracking
were more frequently born with low birth weight or were small for
their gestational age than those who had less exposure.171 Lastly, a
2017 study of approximately 8,000 people living in Northern and
Central Pennsylvania concluded that the individuals with the
highest level of exposure to fracking reported a significantly higher
frequency of fatigue, chronic nasal and sinus, and migraine
symptoms than individuals with lower exposure.172 These three
studies make clear at a minimum that the more heavily one is
exposed to fracking, the greater chance there is for damage to
one’s health.

170

See Peter Rabinowitz et al., Proximity to Natural Gas Wells and Reported Health
Status: Results of a Household Survey in Washington County, Pennsylvania, 123 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSPS. 1, 24 (2015), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/1307732/ [https://perma.cc
/DXW6-WK66].
171
See Shaina L. Stacy, et al., Perinatal Outcomes and Unconventional Natural Gas
Operations in Southwest Pennsylvania, PLOS ONE (2015).
172
See Aaron W. Tustin, et al., Associations Between Unconventional Natural Gas
Development and Nasal and Sinus, Migraine Headache, and Fatigue Symptoms in
Pennsylvania, 125 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 2, 189 (2017). Moreover, other studies have
generally confirmed these findings. See A New Fracking Landscape: Report On Recent
Science Shows Overwhelming Evidence Of Harm, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP. (Mar. 13,
2018), https://www.psr.org/blog/2018/03/13/a-new-fracking-landscape-report-on-recentscience-shows-overwhelming-evidence-of-harm/ [https://perma.cc/3EZV-ZDP5].
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D. How Commonly Is Trade Secret Protection Invoked and Is It
Genuine?
The evidence available since many states began requiring
disclosure of fracking chemicals seems to indicate that trade
secrets are being claimed by the industry in giant frequencies to
avoid meaningful disclosure. For instance, in Texas, after that state
adopted a disclosure law, between April 2011 and December of
2012, fracking companies claimed trade secret or proprietary
protection 10,120 times in reporting related to 12,140 instances of
fracking.173 An investigation by the Obama-era DOE in 2014 came
to a similar conclusion: trade secrets were being invoked 84% of
the time.174 As seen supra in the litigation context, these
invocations of privacy protection have been incredibly powerful at
shielding the public from any knowledge about these chemicals.175
But the true extent of the problem was not known until the
recent 2016 EPA report on the safety of fracking. That report
concluded that although the agency had identified 1,606 chemicals
in fracking fluid and wastewater, they only had useful health
effects information for 173 of those chemicals!176 This alarming
statistic illustrates the extent to which fracking companies have
negated the public’s ability to understand these substances. The
result is that after its chemicals seep into the Ohio river,
Halliburton doesn’t ever have to disclose to local drinking water
regulators what was in those chemicals, since even if the law
required them to do so (which incidentally it did not), the
regulators technically would not even know what chemicals to
look for, since they have no knowledge about these highly secret
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See Jennifer Hiller, Frackers Avoid Fluid Disclosure Despite New Law, STATESMAN
(Feb. 9, 2013), https://www.statesman.com/news/opinion/frackers-avoid-fluid-disclosuredespite-new-law/FDGqPa4z3inJqonVaQCqnO/ [https://perma.cc/B7UG-XE8N].
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See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., TASK FORCE REPORT
ON FRACFOCUS 2.0, at 11 (2014); see also HORWITT, supra note 31, at 4 (concluding that
between 2013 and 2017, 55% of wells in Pennsylvania had at least one secret fracking
chemical used in it, but that this number likely is a vast underestimate due to large
loopholes in reporting requirements).
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See supra Section II.A.
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U.S. EPA, OFF. OF RES. & DEV., supra note 44 (emphasis added).
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compounds.177 Yet, Halliburton has continued to claim that their
products are entirely safe.178
In fact, in the context of protecting their trade secrets,
Halliburton has even questionably equated its products to the
formula for “Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper, KFC’s fried chicken,
[and] Bush’s Baked Beans.”179 However, such a comparison is
inapposite for two very important reasons. First of all, products
like Coca-Cola, which happen to be comprised of certain trade
secret formulas, are externally regulated to be safe for human
consumption by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) while
fracking ingredients receive no similar external federal safety
regulations and are in fact EPA-exempt.180 Furthermore, in CocaCola and similarly trade secret protected food products, the
underlying ingredients and their concentrations are always
disclosed right on the side of the container, while the same cannot
be said for “proprietary” fracking fluids under most current state
disclosure laws.181 Yet, Coca-Cola has been able to not only
enhance safety by giving the public valuable information about the
underlying ingredients its product contains, but also maintain trade
secret status despite such disclosures for over 125 years.182
Therefore, the argument that these fracking chemical additives
are not valid trade secrets partially turns on whether or not reverse
engineering is possible, since that is a crucial affirmative defense
to trade secret misappropriation.183 In fact, the 2014 DOE panel
suggested that reverse engineering is not possible unless there is
some sort of foul play engaged in by the state regulatory body and
that therefore a “systems approach” style of disclosure—saying
what’s in each fracking fluid by reporting a list of overall
chemicals and products used without saying which chemical is in
each product—does not endanger fracking companies’ trade

177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Cf. Blake, supra note 5.
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 13.
Cf. id.
See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 621.
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See id.
See supra Section I.D.
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secrets.184 Scholars have concurred with this notion and said that
“due to the complexity of the fluid components and the way that
they are used, it is extremely difficult for another company to steal
the product.”185 Moreover, toxicologists looking at the issue have
called the systems-approach, which entails fully disclosing the
underlying constituent chemicals in each fracking additive, an
“ideal solution” to allowing the public to learn vital public health
knowledge about these chemicals.186
However, Halliburton has directly pushed back on this idea.187
In its comments to a 2014 Obama DOE proposal to have the
systems approach disclosure utilized on the updated version of the
web database FRACFocus, Halliburton attached a sworn affidavit
from Ron Hyden, an experienced chemical engineer in charge of
creating new fracking products and processes for the company,
attesting that Hyden could take the information disclosed from the
proposed regime and could essentially reverse engineer another
company’s fracking formula.188 According to Hyden, given the
unique characteristics of each formation and well, companies like
Halliburton had created “specific and specialized fracturing fluid
systems . . . and new additives” in order to maximize energy
production from a certain well based on lab testing, research, and
accumulated industry experience.189 Hyden suggested that
precisely what makes each fracking chemical additive valuable to
companies is its underlying “mix of ingredients.”190 For this
reason, if a competitor was able to see the full list of constituent
chemicals for a proprietary additive, in conjunction with the other
information about the type of well where it was being used, Hyden
believed that the competitor would learn “valuable information
about what makes the product effective” and would be able to test
184

Cf. Sherwin, supra note 27, at 638; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF
ENERGY ADVISORY BD., supra note 174, at 13.
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Sherwin, note 27, at 636 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF ENERGY
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the same mix of ingredients under numerous conditions, even
without possessing the underlying product itself.191 In Hyden’s
estimation, experienced fracking industry chemists could reverse
engineer products based on a list of the underlying ingredients and
swore in his testimony that he was able to do this for one of
Halliburton’s competitors.192
Yet, Hyden’s arguments weaken the overall case for trade
secret protection because they seem to suggest that a reasonable
disclosure regime (the systems approach) would lead to reverse
engineering of these products by competitors. While Halliburton
argues that it’s the style of disclosure that leads to the ability to
reverse engineer, a key point that cannot be dismissed is the fact
that neutral observers such as toxicologists have referred to the
systems approach method of disclosure as the one that is best for
public health.193 It is basically an identical style of disclosure as the
one that Coca-Cola is subjected to, yet that product has easily
maintained trade secret status.194 More to the point, the public
drinks a lot of Coca-Cola not only because the FDA says that it’s
safe, but also because they know the actual underlying ingredients
are. Given the documented cases where these chemicals have
gotten into folks’ groundwater, Halliburton is essentially asking
landowners to trust that their products are safe and asserts that any
disclosure regime that would result in meaningful public health
information could cause reverse engineering.195
At common law, one of the six factors controlling treatment of
an idea or formula as a trade secret was “the ease or difficultly
with which the information can be properly acquired or duplicated
by others.”196 Any information which can easily be acquired or
duplicated by others is not really a secret, and therefore is not
deserving of trade secret status. Halliburton has argued that the
products are safe and therefore a systems approach is not necessary

191
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Id. at 38, 40.
See id. at 39–41.
See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 635–36.
See id. at 645.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939) (emphasis added).

1006

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:971

to protect the public.197 However, the fact remains that if the public
needs a systems approach to ensure safety and if such an approach
would lead to reverse engineering, then these products are not
trade secrets.198 This point is edified by the fact that Halliburton
would not be able to successfully make a prima facie case of trade
secret misappropriation against one of their competitors who
recreated one of their fracking products, since the affirmative
defense of reverse engineering would control.199 Therefore, either
way, Halliburton’s argument is defective. On the one hand, if they
are so similar to Coca-Cola that they must be considered trade
secrets, then disclosing the underlying compounds to demonstrate
the safety of the product should not be problematic. On the other, if
these basic disclosures to protect public health lead to reverse
engineering, unlike it does for Coca-Cola, then these products are
not valid trade secrets in the first place.200 At its core, Halliburton’s
argument amounts to unconvincingly claiming trade secrecy as
both a “shield” and a “sword.”
This idea is further edified by general industry practices around
fracking. Typically, oil companies hold the leases for the areas
where fracking will occur and then the lease-holding companies
hire “oilfield services” companies, such as Halliburton or
Schlumberger, to actually frack the wells.201 In order for what each
fracking company does to be proprietary, there has to be an actual
difference between what they can offer their lease-holding
customers on any specific well. Yet, documents leaked from a
fracking job done in Florida at the Collier-Hogan Well indicate this
is not always the case.202 While this incident shows that there is
197

See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 1–2.
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authentic competition between fracking companies, it also
somewhat disproves the notion that each company is offering
something so “proprietary” and “unique” as to deserve trade secret
protection.203
Both Halliburton and Baker Hughes, another fracking
company, made proposals for how they would frack the CollierHogan well to its owner, the Dan A. Hughes company.204 These
proposals were shockingly similar: both companies proposed
injecting their frack fluid at the same “bottom hole pressure” and
during the pad stage, each company proposed doing 7 separate
frack stages, each with the following sequence of fluid used, in
thousands of gallons: 5, 6, 7, 7, 3.5, 1.5.205 The only significant
difference was the percentage of concentration that the companies
wanted to use during the acid stage: Halliburton preferred a 15%
HCL solution while Baker Hughes only wanted to use a 10%
solution.206 Another difference was the product names used for
each component of the fracking solution even though they
presumptively did the exact same thing within the fracturing
fluid.207 Eventually, Baker Hughes was hired to frack the well and
did so before Florida’s regulatory agency revoked its permit and
fined the well operator for disposing oil waste in the shallow
portion of the well, which just so happened to be dangerously close
to the drinking water supply for the city of Naples.208
A closer look at the offerings of Halliburton itself further
bolsters the notion that some of these chemicals are not authentic
trade secrets. In 2011, Halliburton acquired Multi-Chem, which
was the fourth largest oilfield chemical manufacturer at the time.209
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Today, if you go to its website, it lists Multi-Chem’s chemicals as
one of its fracking fluids and describe why it is supposedly
superior to its competitors.210 For the company’s service-marked
“FracProcess System” there are three varieties: basic, intermediate,
and advanced, each one varying in price and degree of how
“custom tailored” it is to the particular formation.211 This raises the
question of just how ‘proprietary’ the basic version of the
FracProcess System truly is, since if it is so un-extraordinary and
generic as to be common knowledge, then it would not be a trade
secret.212 Therefore, it is helpful to understand that on FRACFocus
itself, there is actually a list of commonly used fracking chemicals
and the purposes for which they are used, in a convenient chart.213
For purposes of simplification, the portion of the chart dealing with
chemicals that act as breakers, clay stabilizers, corrosion inhibitors,
friction reducers, gelling agents, non-emulsifiers, and surfactants is
included below214:

/en/Halliburton-Announces-Completion-Multi-Chem-Acquisition
[https://perma.cc/4N53-REF9].
210
See Stimulation Chemical Services: Customized Oilfield Chemicals and Stimulation
Treatments, HALLIBURTON (2018),
https://www.halliburton.com/content/dam
/ps/public/multichem/contents/Brochures/web/Stimulation-Brochure-H012913.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6XA-JHX5] (claiming that it gives operators 150% more production
from the same well if other ingredients are used).
211
See id.
212
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939).
213
See Why Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS CHEM. DISCLOSURE REGISTRY,
http://fracfocus.org/chemical-use/why-chemicals-are-used
[https://perma.cc/A6GPXMFA]; see also What Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS CHEM. DISCLOSURE REGISTRY,
http://fracfocus.org/chemical-use/what-chemicals-are-used
[https://perma.cc/683H3WSX].
214
What Chemicals Are Used, supra note 213.
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TABLE 1:
Chemical Name

CAS

Chemical Purpose

Product Function

Ammonium Persulfate

007727-54-0

Allows a delayed break down of the gel

Breaker

Sodium Chloride

007647-14-5

Product Stabilizer

Breaker

Magnesium Peroxide

014452-57-4

Allows a delayed break down the gel

Breaker

Magnesium Oxide

001309-48-4

Allows a delayed break down the gel

Breaker

Calcium Chloride

010043-52-4

Product Stabilizer

Breaker

Choline Chloride

000067-48-1

Prevents clays from swelling or shifting

Clay Stabilizer

Tetramethyl
ammonium chloride

000075-57-0

Prevents clays from swelling or shifting

Clay Stabilizer

Sodium Chloride

007647-14-5

Prevents clays from swelling or shifting

Clay Stabilizer

Isopropanol

000067-63-0

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing agent

Corrosion Inhibitor

Methanol

000067-56-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing agent

Corrosion Inhibitor

Formic Acid

000064-18-6

Prevents the corrosion of the pipe

Corrosion Inhibitor

Acetaldehyde

000075-07-0

Prevents the corrosion of the pipe

Corrosion Inhibitor

Polyacrylamide

009003-05-8

“Slicks” the water to minimize friction

Friction Reducer

Petroleum Distillate

064741-85-1

Carrier fluid for polyacrylamide friction
reducer

Friction Reducer

Hydrotreated Light
Petroleum Distillate

064742-47-8

Carrier fluid for polyacrylamide friction
reducer

Friction Reducer

Methanol

000067-56-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Friction Reducer

Ethylene Glycol

000107-21-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Friction Reducer

Guar Gum

009000-30-0

Thickens the water in order to suspend the
sand

Gelling Agent

Petroleum Distillate

064741-85-1

Carrier fluid for guar gum in liquid gels

Gelling Agent

Hydrotreated Light
Petroleum Distillate

064742-47-8

Carrier fluid for guar gum in liquid gels

Gelling Agent

Methanol

000067-56-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Gelling Agent

Polysaccharide Blend

068130-15-4

Thickens the water in order to suspend the
sand

Gelling Agent

Ethylene Glycol

000107-21-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Gelling Agent

Lauryl Sulfate

000151-21-3

Used to prevent the formation of
emulsions in the fracture fluid

Non-Emulsifier

Isopropanol

000067-63-0

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Non-Emulsifier

Ethylene Glycol

000107-21-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Non-Emulsifier

Lauryl Sulfate

000151-21-3

Used to increase the viscosity of the fracture
fluid

Surfactant

Ethanol

000064-17-5

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Surfactant
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Naphthalene

000091-20-3

Carrier fluid for the active surfactant
ingredients

Surfactant

Methanol

000067-56-1

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Surfactant

Isopropyl Alcohol

000067-63-0

Product stabilizer and / or winterizing
agent.

Surfactant

2-Butoxyethanol

000111-76-2

Product stabilizer

Surfactant

If Halliburton’s “basic” FracProcess system only utilizes
chemicals that are on the list above for the purposes that the chart
sets out (in addition to the other types of chemicals a fracking fluid
typically contains), then there is a strong argument that it should
not be entitled to trade secret protection. Perhaps the most
important common law factor to determine whether or not an idea
is a trade secret is the extent to which the information is known
outside the business of the party asserting trade secret
protection.215 Under such a test, it seems probable that the basic
formulation would not pass muster as a trade secret, not only
because such information has been disclosed to the public,216 but
also because it is fairly clear that the fracking companies are doing
the same thing on identical wells but simply using different
product names.217
Additionally, some of Halliburton’s more environmentally
friendly fracking products could perhaps be so effective and safe
that there may be a Ruckelshaus-style argument that Congress
should mandate them being made public so that they can become
the new industry standard.218 Specifically, Halliburton created
what it called its CleanSuite™ line of fracking chemicals and
methods, which were first successfully utilized together on the
same well in 2012.219 The most significant component of
CleanSuite™ is the fracturing fluid CleanStim™, the same fluid,
made of ingredients sourced from the food industry, that the
215
216
217

See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939).
See Why Chemicals Are Used, supra note 213.
Cf. Fletcher, supra note 202; cf. also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 37–

41.
218

Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984).
See El Paso Corporation Completed First Natural Gas Well Using All Four
CleanSuite™ Technologies, HALLIBURTON (2012), https://www.halliburton.com
/content/dam/ps/public/common/Case_Histories/H09138.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE89A4QB].
219
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Halliburton executive drank at the 2011 conference described
supra.220
Anybody who believes fracking is dangerous to the
environment should welcome the use of CleanStim™ rather than
dirtier or unhealthier alternatives. However, the available evidence
seems to indicate that CleanStim™ is not being used frequently
whatsoever.221 In fact, in an interview given over four years after
the fluid’s introduction, a Halliburton PR representative noted that
the fluid has been used “hundreds” of times worldwide before
conceding that “it’s not in wide use.”222 This begs the question as
to whether Halliburton simply created CleanStim™ to feign
environmental stewardship with no actual plans to use it. If that
truly is the case, there is actually a very strong argument that
Congress should pass a law, like FIFRA in Ruckelshaus,
mandating the disclosure of beneficial trade secret information to
the public, to increase the usage of clean fracking fluids like
CleanStim™.223 In other words, perhaps CleanStim™, rather than
being a non-genuine trade secret, is a trade secret so wellconceived that public policy dictates sharing it with the rest of the
country; if there was evidence that CleanStim™ could decrease
incidences of groundwater contamination, it seems like this would
be the wisest course of action. On the other hand, some other
commentators have also suggested that CleanStim™ is not as clean
as Halliburton has suggested, since it still must be used in
conjunction with other harmful chemicals to accomplish the
frack.224
220

See HALLIBURTON, supra note 2; ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 1.
Cf. Brandon Mercer, Environmentally-Friendly Savior Of Oil Fracking Industry
Could Be . . . Haliburton? New Fluids Made With Soy, Vegetables, KPIX CBS SF
BAYAREA (July 24, 2014, 3:54 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/07/24
/environmentally-friendly-savior-for-the-oil-fracking-industry-could-be-haliburton-newfluids-made-with-soy-vegetables-food-grade-frac-frack-fracked-shale-cleanstimchemicals/ [https://perma.cc/S76G-97AC].
222
Id.
223
Cf. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
224
See Halliburton Executive Drinks Fracking Fluid at Conference—A Magic Trick?,
WTFRACK (Aug. 23, 2011), http://wtfrackorg.blogspot.com/2011/08/halliburtonexecutive-drinks-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/UD5R-8G9N] (alleging that CleanStim
must still be used in conjunction with dirty, known-to-be-hazardous products such as
ClaySurf-EZ (a clay control device) and GasPerm 1000 (surfactant)).
221
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E. Taking Stock of Current Laws
Given that designation of trade secret status to some of these
fracking chemicals is questionable and that fracking company
privacy abuses create a public health information vacuum, it is
worthwhile to analyze which current state laws are and are not
working. Most states that do require some form of disclosure, such
as Pennsylvania and Montana, utilize the systems approach of
disclosure.225 However, California has gone even further and
required the concentrations and chemical constituents of all
additives, whether trade secrets or not, to be disclosed.226
Perhaps the biggest problem with many of the current state
laws in this arena is that they allow trade secret protection of
fracking fluid chemicals without requiring any real justification as
to why that should be the case.227 In most states where fracking is
happening, such as Pennsylvania, existing disclosure laws require
zero substantiation of the claim of trade secrecy by the fracking
company.228 However, a number of states including Colorado,
Illinois, Nevada, and most recently Montana, have taken the lead
in enacting disclosure laws that require their state regulatory body
to substantiate the trade secret designation before shielding the
public from the underlying information that would otherwise be
disclosed if it was not a trade secret.229
The Montana approach has been hailed by scholars and
observers as a smart first step in fixing the ongoing trade secrets

225

See 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222.1 (b)(2); see S.B. 299, 65th Sess. (Mont. 2017) (enacted).
See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3160(j) (West 2018). Furthermore, California also
requires fracking companies to provide the full information to its state regulators, so that
in the case of an emergency they always have it, and then allows the information
published to the public at large to limit disclosure of the underlying chemical constituents
of a particular additive. See id.; see also California’s Fracking Fluids: California’s
Fracking Disclosure Law, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://www.ewg.org/research/california-s-toxic-fracking-fluid-chemicalrecipe/california-s-fracking-disclosure-law [https://perma.cc/MWZ6-28BJ].
227
Levine, supra note 11, at 27.
228
See e.g., 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222; T. Jackson, Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure
Requirements, CTR. FOR AMERICAN & INT’L LAW, (2017) http://www.cailaw.org
/media/files/IEL/ConferenceMaterial/2017/energyip/tjackson-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F898-JK8L].
229
See Jackson, supra note 228; see also S.B. 299, supra note 14.
226
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issues with fracking fluids.230 On May 4th, 2017, Montana
strengthened its fracking chemicals disclosure law by reasonably
limiting companies’ ability to claim that the chemicals are trade
secrets.231 The stated purpose of the legislation is to “provide a fair
process for disclosure of fracturing fluids to facilitate transparency,
while protecting valuable trade secrets.”232 Like many similar state
laws, Montana’s new disclosure regime requires oil and gas
companies to report the contents of their fracturing fluids to the
state Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (“BOGC”) who in turn
publishes the disclosures.233 As far as what must be disclosed, the
law mandates the following information234:
(1) the chemical compound and identifier for
each constituent ingredient
(2) any hazardous components, product names,
and types of additives used; and
(3) the proposed concentrations of these
chemicals.
In its quest to achieve a fair balance between necessary
transparency and protecting trade secrets, the new law has some
industry-friendly aspects. For instance, once disclosure occurs, the
industry entity can request that BOGC withhold publishing that
was disclosed for confidentiality or trade secret purposes.235 Once
such a request is made, the BOGC determines whether a particular
ingredient is deserving of confidentiality or not.236 Any request for
confidentiality must explicitly explain why the chemical or
concentration at issue237:

230

See Levine, supra note 11, at 27; see also Tyler J. Hall, Full* Disclosure: A Middle
Road in Fracking Fluid Law, ORRICK (Mar. 9, 2017), https://blogs.orrick.com/tradesecrets-watch/2017/03/09/full-disclosure-a-middle-road-in-fracking-fluid-law/
[https://perma.cc/UM6S-FNC7].
231
See S.B. 299, 65th Sess. (Mont. 2017) (enacted).
232
Id.
233
See id.
234
See id.
235
See id.
236
See id.
237
See id.
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Is not already public information
Is actually maintained as confidential within the
company seeking to shield its disclosure
 Whether any other regulatory entity (in other
states) has determined that it is not entitled to be
hidden from exposure to the public
 Has an independent commercial value and to
explain what that value is, and
 Why a ‘systems approach format’ would not
adequately protect proprietary interests.
In the event that the BOGC determines that all of the relevant
criteria for proprietary protection are met, then the five-step
explanation that the law requires will be posted online in lieu of the
actual disclosure.238 This is helpful and renders Montana’s
statutory scheme far superior to other disclosure regimes, where
companies simply post an exemption on the disclosure registry,
because having the five-step explanation will, at a minimum,
illuminate the public about why certain chemicals are valid trade
secrets. This may even facilitate enhanced scientific research.
Furthermore, an unredacted version of the disclosure is kept in
the BOGC’s confidential files at all times.239 On top of this, the
information justifying the proprietary nature of the
chemicals/concentrations found to be deserving of protection from
disclosure must be updated every three years to make sure that it
has not been revealed from some other source and that proprietary
status has been maintained.240 Moreover, if a regulated entity
believes that the BOGC has made an erroneous determination in
denying protection from disclosure, they have the opportunity, via
judicial review, to appeal the BOGC’s determination before any
disclosure is made.241 If the court agrees with the BOGC’s
determination, then such information will be fully published on
FRACfocus; otherwise, it will be shielded from public
disclosure.242
238
239
240
241
242

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

2019]

DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS

1015

The Montana law also has one final benefit for
environmentalists. Under the new law, anything dumped into “state
waters” is never entitled to any confidentiality or protection from
disclosure.243 Montana defines “state waters” fairly broadly as a
“body of water, irrigation system, or drainage system, either
surface or underground.”244 Because “state waters” is defined so
broadly in Montana, this means that the law operates as a
secondary incentive to companies to demonstrate environmental
stewardship, since any egregious dumping of chemicals into state
waters means that polluting trade secrets will be published and
potentially lose proprietary status via mandatory disclosure.
However, the European Union (“EU”) is also taking strong
steps to protect its citizens from potentially dangerous compounds
like certain varieties of fracking fluids. In stark contrast to current
U.S. law which only requires the submission of safety data if it is
available, the EU requires “companies generally . . . to prove the
safety of their chemicals before use.”245 Europe’s underlying
chemical regulatory philosophy, the so-called ‘precautionary
principle’, perhaps better termed the “better safe than sorry”
concept, requires governments to essentially force corporations and
other entities seeking trade secret protection to first prove that their
products and processes are safe before gaining protection.246 Julie
Zink has argued that such an approach should be adopted in
America and recommended amending the DTSA to reflect that
pro-public health policy.247
Zink’s proposal specifically contemplates amending the DTSA
at 18 U.S.C. § 1839 by adding an additional element to be satisfied

243

See id.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-6-102-(19) (2017); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5103-(34) (2017) (defining state waters as stated above and carving out a small exception
for pools used to store pollutants and irrigation or land application disposal waters that do
not return to state waters).
245
Michael Hawthorn, Firemaster 550 the Latest Flame Retardant Allowed onto
Market
Without
Thorough
Study,
CHI.
TRIB.
(May
10,
2012),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-met-flames-regulators-20120510story.html [https://perma.cc/PU4N-M2RB].
246
See Zink, supra note 13, at 1177.
247
See id.
244
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for something to be considered a trade secret under that law.248 The
additional requirement could be tersely stated as a third subsection
of that definition as “the information does not endanger public
health.”249 Zink also recommends using third-party testing to
determine whether or not a product is safe, which would maintain
neutrality in the determination.250
F. “Confidentiality Creep” Incidents and “Opportunistic
Privacy”
Professor David Levine has written extensively about modern
trade secret abuses.251 According to Levine, companies like
Halliburton have come to massively overuse trade secrets in such a
fashion that it has completely precluded a discussion of whether or
not the public’s interests are adequately protected through the
awarding of certain trade secret protections.252 In particular, Levine
contrasts trade secrets with its other intellectual property-based
cousins such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks—all of which
inherently have limits—while trade secrets are inherently
unlimited by their nature.253 In contrast to all other forms of
intellectual property, trade secrets can “last indefinitely and are
difficult to limit, absent independent discovery . . . [, disclosure] or
reverse engineering.”254 Levine describes the underlying rationale
for trade secret protection, a so-called utilitarian “incentive to
innovate”; however, when that rationale is dubious, or in some
cases non-existent, and the public has an interest in access to that
same information being suppressed by trade secret protection, none
of the external limiting factors for trade secret protection—
independent discovery, disclosure, or reverse engineering—are
adequate and thus lead to “informational blind-spots.”255 The fact
that the public knows so little about many of the fracking fluids
248

See id. at 1179–80.
Id.
250
See id. at 1177.
251
See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 176–77 (2007).
252
See id.
253
See Levine, supra note 11, at 20.
254
Id. at 21.
255
Id.
249
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being widely used around the country is exactly the type of blindspot that Levine worries about.
Other scholars have challenged the traditional justifications for
trade secret protection. Historically, the policies favoring trade
secret protection were to incentivize innovation, to increase
investment in human capital, and to serve as a source of law that
regulates commercial ethics.256 Weighed against those factors, the
classical policies opposing trade secret protection are the fact that
it harms competition, that it takes resources to maintain protected
“secret” status, and that it ultimately harms employee mobility to
move between companies.257 While considering how these policies
impact the use of trade secrets in the fracking context, another
claimed downside of trade secret protection seems incredibly
revealing: namely, that trade secret protection engenders a
particular type of innovation, one which fosters “development of
information that is itself amendable to being kept secret.”258 Levine
has argued that fracking chemical manufacturers fall precisely into
this category, since it is those chemical companies who actually
understand the health risks that their products pose to the public;
yet the companies, out of fear of future liability, have basically
zero incentive to be more transparent than they currently are, even
if their products actually are safe.259
Levine has also coined two terms, “confidentiality creep” and
“opportunistic privacy”, which are helpful to understanding the
fracking trade secrets debate.260 Levine describes confidentiality
creep as “the quiet, under-scrutinized, amorphous expansion of the
kinds of information deemed inappropriate for public
consumption.”261 The most salient example of confidentiality creep
in the fracking context, examined supra, is the common industry
practice of entering into confidential settlements with adversely-

256

See John R. Thomas, The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy, 3 CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41391.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P8CC-RHTC].
257
See id. at 4.
258
Id.
259
See Levine, supra note 11, at 27–28.
260
See id. at 13.
261
Id. at 13.
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affected landowners so that the true identities of their potentially
harmful chemicals or the true extent of damage done is never
revealed to the public.262
Levine defines “opportunistic privacy” as “the dubious use of
privacy law and principles as an information control tool.”263
Although there are numerous examples of opportunistic privacy in
this context, among the most important is the Pennsylvania
fracking chemical disclosure law, which originally required
doctors treating patients affected by these secret chemicals to sign
confidentiality agreements in order to get access to that critical
information.264 The policy behind this “physician gag rule” can
only be interpreted as favoring trade secret protection over
protection of public health. Moreover, the law basically required
the doctors to choose between their freedom of speech or a
violation of their Hippocratic oath when dealing with such patients.
In a very positive development, however, that aspect of the law
was recently struck down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as
violative of the state’s constitution.265
According to Levine, confidentiality creep and opportunistic
privacy, when used in conjunction with trade secret protection “can
provide or maintain the information dominance necessary for
questions or concerns to remain unanswerable, even as the
technology becomes increasingly adopted.”266 This is a poignant
description of what is happening in the fracking industry:
companies like Halliburton are using trade secret protection, in
262

See, e.g. Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11; Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well,
and Concern There May Be More, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/04natgas.html [https://perma.cc/JF4V-26VM];
Tr. of In-Chambers Proceeding, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 2010–3954 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Aug. 23, 2011); Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.), Inc., No. 4:11-cv00474-JLH (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissal with prejudice upon out-of-court
settlement).
263
Levine, supra note 11, at 13.
264
See 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b)(10).
265
See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 356, 569-–77 (Pa. 2016) (holding
that the PA fracking disclosure law which required doctors to sign confidentiality
agreements in order to treat patients violated the state’s constitution because it gave
‘special treatment’ to the oil and gas industry and overly limited the rights of doctors to
treat their patients).
266
Levine, supra note 11, at 15 (internal citations omitted).
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conjunction with confidentiality agreements, when environmental
or public health damage is done. Moreover, when such harm does
occur, captured regulators are willing to mostly discount the
findings in complaints given to them. Overall, this has engendered
a system where only Halliburton (or its peers) actually know the
possible negative health effects of certain fracking fluids.267 Levine
decries the fact that fracking companies’ improper use of these
information control tools has prevented the public from even
understanding what information it needs, wants, and why that is so,
to the point that we are on a path to “losing public trust in facts
themselves.”268 Furthermore, our current methods of handling
information suppression are poorly adapted to the modern context
in which it is happening; the companies have vested information
interests, the law is too general, and most importantly, current “law
makes no distinctions on whether or not certain information is in
the public interest.”269
III. FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND
PROPRIETARY PROTECTION
A. Option #1: States Could Adopt a Similar Fracking Disclosure
Law as Montana
The new Montana law has numerous benefits. In Levine’s
view, the law represents Montana’s “recognition that the public
may have a greater interest in access to information than
previously acknowledged by law or policy.”270 This recognition is
embodied in the underlying purpose of the law, which is to balance
common sense disclosures with justified, valid trade secret
protections; therefore, the law has the benefit of generally being
supported by both industry and environmental groups.271
Moreover, it should also give the industry more assurances that
their proprietary information is safe with the BOGC and prevent

267
268
269
270
271

See id., at 27; Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12.
Levine, supra note 11, at 15.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 27.
See Hall, supra note 230.
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the need for further restrictive legislation on the public such as we
saw in Pennsylvania, with the implementation of the “physician
gag rule”. Furthermore, the law is quite strong on truly making
fracking companies explain their trade secret designation. Under it,
any questionable assertions of trade secrecy should theoretically
fail.
However, the Montana approach is not without its downsides
as well. Chief among these is the problem of regulatory
‘capture.’272 As documented in the Public Herald investigation in
Pennsylvania where the oil and gas industry captured regulators
and how it resulted in serious environmental degradation, the fact
that the Montana law leaves determination of trade secret or
proprietary status solely in the hands of state regulators is
somewhat concerning.273 The law’s structure, while definitely an
improvement over earlier disclosure regimes, is far from perfect
and still leaves a good deal of room for exploitation. Furthermore,
environmentalists have criticized the timing of the disclosure
mandated by the law since it only requires a minimum of fortyeight hours’ notice given to the state, which is not enough time for
affected landowners to conduct necessary pre-drilling groundwater
tests.274 As demonstrated by the Zimmermans and Leightons, such
water tests are a necessary step towards having any viable claim
against one of these fracking companies when one’s water is
poisoned by the process.275
Interestingly, one unexpected criticism that has sprouted since
the law’s passage is that because it is so robust at protecting trade
secrets, this actually makes fracking less safe for the
environment.276 According to BOGC administrator Jim Halvorson,
272

See generally 20th Century U. S. Capitalism & Reg., KHAN ACAD.,
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/history-survey/us-historysurvey/v/20th-century-capitalism-and-regulation-in-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/D8A9-77N3] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
273
See Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12.
274
See Tom Lutey, Montana Fracking Fluid Disclosure Rules Draw Critics, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Sept. 19, 2018), https://billingsgazette.com/news/government-and-politics
/montana-fracking-fluid-disclosure-rules-draw-critics/article_985dd823-329a-5401-84883b976ddd6c22.html [https://perma.cc/26BE-5WCK].
275
See id.; see also Hurdle, supra note 135; see generally Leighton, supra note 140.
276
See Lutey, supra note 274.

2019]

DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS

1021

drilling companies in Montana had warned the regulatory body
that “in some cases non-trade secret chemicals are more harmful,
but would be substituted to keep trade secrets under wraps.”277 Yet,
this actually implicitly reveals the true weakness of the Montana
solution: although it is strong at requiring a robust determination of
trade secrecy, such a determination does not necessarily further
public health. Moreover, the law is also very much reactionary
rather than precautionary. Specifically, if an environmental
calamity happened with these trade secret chemicals, as has
happened elsewhere, the information necessary to rectify the
damage would be safe with the BOGC, however, the damage
would already be done. For these specific reasons, the Montana
model is the less desirable of the two solutions proposed by this
Note.
B. Option #2: Incorporate the “Precautionary Principle” into the
Definition of a Trade Secret
The proposal by Professor Julie Zink to incorporate the socalled “precautionary principle” into the definition of a trade secret
under the DTSA is a robust idea that could solve many of the
tensions that this paper seeks to address.278 Like the rules currently
in effect in the European Union, the precautionary principle would
simply shift the burden and require companies to demonstrate
safety in return for trade secret protection rather than assuming that
all trade secrets are safe without requiring any showing, as U.S.
law currently does.279 The underlying policy rationale of this
principle is essentially one of the main arguments that this Note
has sought to make: the public has a right to know about
information that impacts health and safety; therefore, it makes
sense to require a pre-protection showing by the entity seeking
trade secret status to first simply demonstrate that what they want
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to protect is actually safe.280 If a product or process was deemed
unsafe, it could never receive trade secret protection and the public
would therefore be able to research and protect itself from possible
use of that product or process.281
There are numerous positive aspects of Zink’s approach. First,
by adding the precautionary principle that forces companies to
explain that their trade secret is safe before the damage is done, it
implicitly prevents victims from having to request relief after the
fact and theoretically prevents the damage from occurring in the
first place.282 Moreover, assuming retroactive application, any
currently unsafe but trade secret protected products or processes
would actually be exposed for their dangers and, once that
information was known, the dangers of the product could be
studied. This would enhance overall public health. Finally, Zink’s
approach is ideal because it would bring trade secret protection
back in line with the concept’s original purpose—to promote
commercial competition—rather than shielding the public from
knowledge about potential public health dangers, which is how it is
generally being used in the fracking context today.
However, there are some drawbacks of Zink’s approach. The
biggest of these is the fact that the DTSA does not pre-empt state
law at this point;283 therefore, to have a truly meaningful impact,
this re-definition of “trade secret” would need to happen under
state laws and therefore the UTSA as well. Adding in “the
information does not endanger public health” to the UTSA’s trade
secret definition would not only better balance public health and
proprietary protection but would also likely spur states to amend
their own laws in line with the new model version of the UTSA.
Another downside is the basic reality that Zink’s approach would
be significantly costlier on regulated entities than the Montana
approach. This cost would be born not only in the actual safety
testing itself, but also expensive litigation determining what “safe”
actually means. Finally, Zink’s approach may not completely fix
280
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the fracking context since the use of confidentiality agreements has
also been a huge issue preventing adequate knowledge about the
impact of hydraulic fracturing on public health, however, it is a
strong start to clarifying the definition of a trade secret.
CONCLUSION: ADOPT ZINK’S APPROACH AT BOTH STATE AND
FEDERAL LEVEL
Looking macroscopically at the two proposed solutions, it
becomes clear that Montana’s law better balances the competing
needs of public disclosure and protecting truly valid trade secrets.
However, Zink’s approach has a stronger stance on protecting
public health. Yet because, at the end of the day, the protection of
trade secret information could never justify the degradation of our
public health, Zink’s approach is the better option, even if it
ultimately would be significantly costlier on regulated entities.
Theoretically, the large costs that are currently absorbed by the
public for these unsafe trade secret abuses would simply be shifted
back to the regulated entities who ushered them into effect.
Because the largest downside of Zink’s proposal is simply that
only amending the DTSA would not change state law, the proper
solution is to simply to amend the UTSA and state law as well in a
similar fashion, so that each incorporates the precautionary
principle. Additionally, some future limits on companies’ abilities
to use confidential agreements to silence folks who have been
seriously harmed should be considered as well. However, those
solutions are beyond the scope of this Note.
The dubious use of privacy principles by Halliburton in
particular, as documented above in this Note, would be rectified by
Zink’s approach. Based on the limited results available, it seems
that Halliburton has no incentive to use its eco-friendly fracking
products, CleanSuite™ and CleanStim™, unless a customer is
seeking to be environmentally-friendly.284 However, if the
precautionary principle was incorporated into U.S. trade secret
definitions, then neither Halliburton nor its peers would be able to
utilize any harmful fracking solutions. Assuming that the literature
284
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and sourcing claimed by Halliburton are accurate, however, a
product like CleanStim™ should easily be found to be safe and
thus deserving of trade secret protection, while other peer products
which are not found safe would be banned and would lose trade
secret status.285 Therefore, Halliburton would be able to reap the
proprietary value from their valiant efforts to come up with a safe
fracturing fluid while their peers would not get the same protection
unless they created similarly safe fluids. Thus, this directly
demonstrates not only how the precautionary principle protects the
public from harm, but also implicitly incentivizes innovations that
do the same thing. Alternatively, Congress could directly
incentivize such innovation with a FIFRA-style disclosure law,
although that is a more drastic solution.286
Given that fracking is clearly going to be a large part of the
U.S. domestic energy economy moving forward, it is important
that we come up with the proper approach. Based on the dangers it
poses, fracking must be done correctly if it is going to be done at
all. Therefore, since it best balances the paramount concern of
public health against the still-important practice of robustly
protecting proprietary and trade secret information, Professor Julie
Zink’s proposal to incorporate the precautionary principle into the
definition of a trade secret under both federal and state law is the
proper course of action. Hopefully members of the U.S. and state
governments will follow suit and help make these important trade
secret and fracking regulatory reform efforts a reality.
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